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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











CHRISTOPHER LEBLANC; MERIDIAN HOSPITAL SYSTEMS CORPORATION 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. No. 1-19-cv-01137 
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
_____________ 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2020 
_____________ 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 







CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Post Acute Medical, LLC, (“PAM”) owns and operates hospitals around the 
country.  PAM contracted with Texas-based Meridian Hospital Systems Corporation 
(“Meridian”) and Meridian’s owner, Christopher LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”), for Meridian to 
provide database software services.  PAM’s and Meridian’s business relationship took a 
turn for the worse, and LeBlanc and Meridian brought a Texas state court action against 
PAM and PAM hospitals located in Texas.  That lawsuit remains pending.  PAM, which 
is headquartered in Pennsylvania, then filed this action against LeBlanc and Meridian in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, claiming 
violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 et seq., violations of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C § 1030 et seq., and breach of contract.  The 
District Court granted LeBlanc’s and Meridian’s motion to dismiss for lack of venue, and 
we will affirm. 
I. 
We write for the parties and so recount only the facts necessary to our decision.  In 
its verified amended complaint (the “complaint”), PAM avers that it contracted with 
Meridian to “set up a computerized database” to “house and aggregate PAM’s data,” 
including protected health information and other confidential data protected by the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.  Appendix (“App.”) 728–29.  PAM is a 
Delaware corporation headquartered in Enola, Pennsylvania, with “network affiliated 
hospitals throughout the country.”  Id. at 729.  Meridian is a Texas corporation 
headquartered in Dallas, Texas, and LeBlanc, the majority owner of Meridian, is a Texas 
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resident.  According to the complaint, venue is proper in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania “because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this civil 
action—including the execution of the contract governing this dispute—occurred in this 
district.”  App. 735.  While the complaint states that PAM is headquartered in Enola, 
Pennsylvania and that venue is proper in the Middle District, it contains no specific 
allegation that any particular event complained of occurred in that district. 
On July 25, 2019, LeBlanc and Meridian filed a motion to dismiss this action for 
lack of venue, inter alia, which was fully joined with the filing of their reply brief on 
September 9, 2019.  One week later, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss for 
lack of venue, without prejudice to refiling in a proper venue.  PAM moved for 
reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  This timely appeal followed.  
II.1 
PAM contends that the District Court erred in granting the motion to dismiss for 
lack of venue and in denying reconsideration.  Among other arguments, PAM claims that 
the District Court erroneously credited factual statements made by LeBlanc and Meridian 
for the first time in their reply brief in support of the motion to dismiss.  LeBlanc and 
Meridian contest this characterization.  We need not reach this question, however, 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s legal determination that venue was improper and review the decision to 
dismiss the complaint for abuse of discretion.  Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 
873, 878 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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because the complaint itself provides ample support for the District Court’s granting of 
the motion to dismiss for lack of venue.2 
A. 
LeBlanc and Meridian moved to dismiss, as relevant here, for improper venue 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3).  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391’s venue 
provision, a civil action may be brought in:  
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are 
residents of the State in which the district is located; 
 
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the 
subject of the action is situated; or 
 
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as 
provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is 
subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)–(3).  In its complaint and appellate briefs, PAM contends that 
venue is proper under § 1391(b)(2).  Accordingly, in reviewing the District Court’s order 
of dismissal, we must determine whether “a substantial part of the events or omissions 
 
2 PAM also complains that the District Court ruled on the motion to dismiss before PAM 
had sufficient opportunity to seek leave to file a sur-reply or to seek discovery on venue.  
But District Courts are allowed — indeed, encouraged — to rule promptly on fully 
briefed motions.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (“These rules govern[ing] the procedure in all 
civil actions . . . . should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the 
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding.”).  Here, the District Court had already permitted PAM to amend the 
complaint once and granted the motion after it had been fully briefed for a week.  In any 
event, in affirming the order of the District Court, we do not rely upon any factual 
arguments advanced by LeBlanc and Meridian in their reply brief in support of the 
motion to dismiss. 
5 
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the 
action is situated” in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  § 1391(b)(2). 
We held in Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc. v. Martino, “[t]he test for 
determining venue is not the defendant’s ‘contacts’ with a particular district, but rather 
the location of those ‘events or omissions giving rise to the claim,’” and although the 
venue statute does not “require[] a court to select the ‘best’ forum, the weighing of 
‘substantial’ may at times seem to take on that flavor.”  36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citation omitted).  And in order to “assess[] whether events or omissions giving rise to 
the claims are substantial,” we “look at the nature of the dispute.”  Id. at 295.  The 
moving party has the burden of proving improper venue.  Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 
695 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1982). 
We are unable to discern any basis in the complaint or its numerous exhibits that 
would allow us to conclude that venue is proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
All three counts allege wrongdoing by LeBlanc and Meridian, who are located in Texas.  
Count 2, which claims a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, appears to 
focus entirely on LeBlanc’s conduct in the course of the Texas state court litigation, as do 
various other sections of the complaint.  See, e.g., App. 748–51 (describing “Meridian 
Improperly Us[ing] Litigation as a Weapon to Extort Money from PAM”); id. at 756–58 
(explaining the details and context of LeBlanc’s alleged unauthorized access and 
disclosure of confidential patient health information during a hearing in Texas state 
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court); id. at 770 (identifying LeBlanc’s unauthorized access during Texas proceeding as 
specific evidence of breach of contract).3 
 PAM also contends that the District Court erred in not drawing the reasonable 
inference that because it was headquartered in Enola, Pennsylvania, the trade secrets at 
issue were created in Enola.  But PAM is a Delaware corporation that operates 
throughout the United States, and in the complaint, PAM described the “Highly 
Confidential Data” at issue as “relat[ing] to patients in PAM’s network affiliated 
hospitals throughout the country, as well as valuable customer and vendor contact lists 
and preference information.”  App. 729.  While national operation alone does not 
establish that venue is not proper in a particular district, it does undercut PAM’s 
argument that any trade secrets must necessarily have been created in the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania.  Similarly, PAM separately alleges that it “input [this] Highly 
Confidential Data . . . into Meridian’s Q1 application so PAM could use the application 
for its daily operations,” but does not allege in the complaint that it input this data at its 
corporate headquarters instead of at its many hospitals elsewhere in the country.  App. 
763.  Nor do the exhibits attached to the complaint provide any information to this effect.  
By contrast, LeBlanc and Meridian contend that all of the alleged events occurred 
in Texas.  Based solely on PAM’s own statements in the complaint and attached exhibits, 
we agree.  The events giving rise to PAM’s claims — focused upon the conduct of a 
 
3 On appeal, PAM argues that LeBlanc’s conduct in the Texas litigation was only “one of 
many facts PAM asserted” in the action, but does not explain which other facts averred in 
the complaint do show that venue is proper in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  PAM 
Br. 29. 
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Texas company (and its Texas-based owner) in a Texas litigation and in providing 
services to PAM’s hospitals around the country — fail to show a “substantial” connection 
to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
did not err in determining that venue was improper and that it did not abuse its discretion 
in dismissing the complaint.4  
III. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing for lack of 
venue. 
 
4 We have considered PAM’s other arguments and find them unavailing.  This includes 
PAM’s argument that the District Court erred in denying reconsideration. 
